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Abstract
Research and development (R&D) project selection is a critical interface between the product development
strategy of an organization and the process of managing projects day-to-day. This article describes the project
selection problem faced by an R&D group of BMW (Munich, Germany). The problem was structured as
minimizing the gap between target performance of the technology to be developed and actual performance of
the current technology along chosen criteria. A mathematical programming model helped this organization to
increase the transparency of their selection process, which previously had been based on experience coupled
with evaluation of individual projects in isolation Implementation was a success in that the predevelopment
group continues to use the model to make better decisions. However, the organization did not use the model
for its intended purpose: constrained optimization. The traditional explanation for this partial implementation
is that the analytical model did not capture all considerations relevant to optimization (e.g., uncertainty or
strategic fit), and that further model refinements are required to achieve further implementation. We offer an
alternative explanation, one based on the technology transfer literature. The diffusion of the analytical model
from academia to industry faced the same problems as any technology transfer: Significant tacit knowledge
had to be transferred along with the codified knowledge of the analytical model. This required iterated
problem solving, which required the limited time and resources of the diffusing agents (academia) as well as
the adopting agents (industry). Thus, the organization adopted only those elements of the modeling method
that could be transferred within the resource constraints, focusing on those elements offering the highest
benefit per effort invested.
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Abstract 
R&D project selection is a critical interface between the product development strategy 
of an organization and the process of managing projects day-to-day. This article de-
scribes the project selection problem faced by the transmission pre-development group 
of BMW. The group had to choose a portfolio of projects to set the foundation for the 
"best powertrain 2000." This problem of project selection was structured as minimiz-
ing the gap between target perfom1ance and actual perfom1ance along chosen criteria. 
A mathematical progranm1ing model helped this organization to increase the transpar-
ency of their selection process, which previously had been based on experience coupled 
with evaluation of individual projects in isolation. The model was used to structure 
data collection, to apply to consistent criteria to the selection of pre-development proj-
ects, and to compare weighted project benefits. Implementation was a success in that 
the pre-development group continues to use it to make better decisions. 
However, the organization did not use the model for constrained optimization. We see 
two reasons for this partial implementation of the model. First, .an analytical model 
cannot capture all considerations relevant to optimization (e.g., uncertainty or strategic 
fit). Thus, constrained optimization promised only marginal further benefits while re-
quiring substantial additional effort. Second, the diffusion of the analytical model from 
academia to industry faced the same problems as any technology transfer: Significant 
tacit knowledge must be transferred along with the codified knowledge of the analytical 
model. This required iterated problem solving, which itself required the limited time 
and resources of the diffusing agents (academia) as well as the adopting agents (indus-
try). Thus, the organization adopted only those elements of the modeling method that 
could be transferred within the resource constraints, focusing on those elements offering 
the highest benefit per effort invested. 
Keywords: R&D, project selection, mathematical programming, analytical models, 
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1 Introduction 
Project selection is a critical management activity in research and development (R&D) 
organizations. It allocates resources to and sets priorities among R&D programs that 
will detem1ine the future business mix of a company (Roussel et a!. 1991, Cooper et al. 
1997). It thus provides a critical link between the goals of an organization's new prod-
uct development (NPD) strategy and the activities of its NPD process. 
Because project selection can involve a multitude of interdependent decisions in com-
plex circumstances, it has provided researchers fertile ground to develop highly struc-
tured, model-based decision support tools ( cf, Beged-Dov 1965). This research stream 
has offered a wide variety of analytical methods for choosing R&D projects to meet 
strategic objectives. However, the modelers involved in this research strean1 have, for a 
long time now, complained that their proposed approaches are not widely adopted in 
practice (Souder 1978, Schmidt and Freeland 1992, Cabral-Cardoso and Payne 1996, 
Burnett et al. 1993). This has typically justified further attempts to improve (and pub-
lish) these analytical models to better meet the perceived needs of industry. Although 
this activity has greatly advanced the sophistication of these analytical models, it has 
done little to increase their adoption by those for whom they are designed to benefit 
(Hall and Nauda 1990). 
Literature on the practice of Operations Research (OR) recognizes that the implementa-
tion of analytical methods should follow a structured process ( cf, Corbett and Van Was-
senhove 1993 ), and often requires the focal organization to change in multiple direc-
tions at the same time. It is, therefore, not surprising that this process often fails 
(Mitchell 1993, p. 183). In this paper we extend current explanations for the lack of 
diffusion of such models by drawing on the extant literature of technology transfer. We 
argue that by doing so we can shed further light on the process of developing and im-
plementing quantitative methods of R&D project selection, which leads to higher 
chances of adoption. 
Specifically, we present a case study of the introduction of one such analytical project 
selection method into an R&D organization, namely the transmission predevelopment 
group at BMW. This R&D subunit faced the challenge of pre-developing new tech-
nologies and in1provements to existing technologies to provide the technological foun-
dation for the "best powertrain 2000." They started by identifying 80 candidate projects 
among which a choice had to be made. The problem was identified as one of selecting 
a subset of the 80 projects to minimize the total gap between target and current product 
performance while not exceeding the limited resources available to the predevelopment 
group. This problem structure was an ideal candidate for implementation of a mathe-
matical progranm1ing model of project selection. Thus, the authors developed a mixed-
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integer program for project selection and worked with the predevelopment group to im-
plement it for the "best powertrain 2000." 
Four important lessons for researchers and managers of R&D emerge from this case 
study: 
1. We present a quantitative model of R&D project selection along with a description 
of how this model was implemented in an actual R&D organization. The detailed 
description of framework development, data collection and joint problem solving 
can help interested readers to adapt the model to their own R&D organization. 
2. Consistent with previous findings in the literature, the model was used to structure 
data collection, to apply consistent criteria to the selection of pre-development proj-
ects, and to compare weighted project benefits. This allowed the R&D subunit to 
make the project selection process more transparent and fact-based. 
3. The quantitative model was only partially adopted by the organization. The re-
source-constrained optimization feature of the model was never fully understood or 
utilized. Two reasons for this partial adoption behavior are explored. 
1. The first reason is consistent with previous research in this area in that it recog-
nizes that the analytical model was incomplete and failed to capture adequately all 
possible aspects of the problem-for example, uncertainty, risk behavior, or stra-
tegic fit. Therefore, constrained optimization promised only marginal further 
benefits while requiring substantial additional effort, the organization made an 
economic decision to adopt only those elements of the modeling method offering 
the highest benefit per effort invested. Under this reasoning, future improvements 
to the modeling methodology could lead to further adoption. 
n. The second reason draws from the technology transfer literature. Full adoption 
would have required significant additional resources and time from both the 
adopting organization and the diffusing agents, yet both had only lin1ited re-
sources available to attend to the transfer. The partial adoption of the technology 
had as much to do with the limited time window of the diffusing agents as it did 
with the lin1ited resources of the adopting organization. 
4. During the implementation process, the in1portance of "boundary spanners" became 
apparent in introducing, filtering and diffusing the new method into the organiza-
tion. This refers to those individuals who span the "gap" between the R&D subunit 
and external sources of innovation, or between the R&D subunit and other subunits 
within the organization. 
In the remainder of this article, we first review the relevant literature on project selec-
tion and technology transfer, and then describe in tum the starting point of the organi-
zation, the process of introducing the new method, results obtained, management of re-
sistance, and reasons for not using the method as an optimization tool. We conclude 
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with a discussion of the insights to be had from drawing from the extant literature on 
technology transfer and the diffusion of innovations. 
2 Literature: Project Selection and Technology Transfer 
In this work, we draw on two streams of research. The first is a large body of work ad-
dressing the question of how to select product development projects. The second is re-
lated to technology transfer in general, and specifically the transfer and implementation 
of operations research models. 
2. 1 R&D Project Selection 
Within the project selection work, we see three relevant sub-streams. The first empha-
sizes the connection of innovation projects to strategy, illuminating issues of risk bal-
ance and strategic complementarity of the portfolio ( c.f. Krogh et a!. 1988, Roussel et 
a!. 1991, Wheelwright and Clark 1992, Cooper et a!. 1997). These approaches are very 
useful for assessing the strategic impact of a portfolio of major development undertak-
ings. They are, however, only qualitative and restricted to an aggregate level of analy-
sis. They cannot easily be used for concrete decisions at the level of individual devel-
opment projects. 
The second sub-stream consists of the standard decision theory methodolobry, applica-
ble on the operational level of individual projects. It consists of ranking projects ac-
cording to a number of weighted decision criteria and then picking the best ones. This 
is the most widely used in practice ( cf, Brenner 1994 ). As decision weights are difficult 
to define and often contested by different parties involved, the most common method-
ology is to collapse the decision problem corresponding to a single project into a single 
financial number, such as net present value (NPV) (Hess 1993; Sharpe and Keelin, 
1998) or break-even time (BET) (House and Price 1991). Alternatively, the analytical 
hierarchy process offers a method for structuring and justifying multiple criteria (Lib-
eratore 1987, Brenner 1994). All these methods share the drawback that neither uncer-
tainty nor interactions among projects--that is, among those competing for the same 
scarce resources--can be captured. 
A third sub-stream of work within project selection literature, based on mathematical 
programming models, has long been proposed to optimize the selection of projects in 
portfolios (Beged-Dov 1965, Benson eta!. 1993, Schmidt and Freeland 1992, Souder 
1973 and 1978). A special powerful feature of these models is their ability to include 
interactions among projects. Examples for such interactions are competition for the 
same resource pool, system level interactions through mutual incompatibilities, syner-
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gistic enhancements or project "enablers," or market interactions if the market criteria 
are not separable and additive (Fox eta!. 1984). Czajkowski and Jones (1986) describe 
how some of the above-mentioned types of interactions can be represented in a mixed 
integer linear program, based on an application in the aerospace industry. The opera-
tional analysis may also be embedded into a hierarchical filter, where projects not fit-
ting the strategic mission are eliminated prior to detailed portfolio selection by the 
mathematical programming model (Yap and Souder 1993). Mathematical programs 
can also incorporate risk by including sensitivity analysis and probabilistic violations of 
constraints (Czajkowski and Jones 1986), but the capability of incorporating risk is 
limited (Fox eta!. 1984, Souder 1978). 
Although this stream of work has yielded successful examples of project portfolio se-
lection under many different problem-specific circumstances, the resulting analytical 
models have yet to be widely adopted by practitioner s (Souder 1978, Schmidt and 
Freeland 1992, Burnett et al. 1993, Cabral-Cardoso and Payne 1996). One classic form 
of response to this phenomenon has been to in1prove the modeling methodology. Al-
though this has lead to great advances in model fornmlation and analysis, it has done 
little to spread the adoption of such models. Another response has been to recognize 
that too much effort is being spent on increasing the sophistication of the models and 
not enough on the means by which they are understood and adopted by their intended 
audience (Hall and Nauda 1990). It has been suggested that the greatest value to be had 
from quantitative modeling efforts is the "managerial insight" gained from such models 
(c.f. Fortuin eta!. 1992, Corbett and Van Wassenhove 1993). This managerial insight 
is more likely to be gained in the process of transfer than from the actual implementa-
tion of the model. 
2.2 Technology Transfer 
We suggest that the in1plementation of operations research models is not unlike the 
transfer of many other technologies and thus, one can learn from the extant literature on 
technology transfer. This literature describes, sometimes in conflicting tem1s, the im-
portance of strong and weak ties in the diffusion of innovations. Weak ties, defined as 
distant and infrequent relationships between individuals, offer access to sources of non-
redundant inforn1ation (Granovetter 1973; Hansen, 1999). Gatekeepers (Allen and 
Cohen, 1969) or boundary spanners (Galbraith, 1973; Tushn1an, 1977) play an impor-
tant role in the adoption and diffusion of new methods by spanning several organiza-
tional interfaces both within and external to the organization. These weak ties yield op-
portunities to spot innovative technologies that can be brought into the organization. 
However, the product innovation literature also suggests that strong ties, close and fre-
quent interaction between individuals, are necessary for effective technology transfer 
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(Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Leonard-Barton and Sinha, 1993; Henderson and Cockburn, 
1994; Eisenhart and Tabrizi, 1995; Szulanski, 1996). While codified information might 
be useful in some cases of technology transfer, critical aspects of the innovation may 
remain tacit and difficult to impart (Nelson and Winter 1982, Winter 1987). Significant 
interactions between the diffusing agent and the potential adopter may be needed to re-
solve the an1biguity surrounding an innovation and to actually implement it (Arrow 
1969). Thus, both the potential adopter and the diffuser of a complex innovation will 
have to invest resources (notably manpower) that are temporarily unavailable for other, 
possibly more important activities. 
3 The Case Study 
In this section, we describe the project selection project that we carried out in coopera-
tion with the powertrain predevelopment group at BMW. The pre-development group 
was responsible for bringing technology components--here, transmission compo-
nents-to the point of technical maturity where they could be incorporated into vehicle 
development. A senior R&D management committee, as a rule, then decided whether 
or not the series development group would develop the concepts proposed by the pre-
development group. However, sometin1es vehicle development picked up ideas directly 
from external suppliers or other R&D sub-units within the organization, such as corpo-
rate research. 
The predevelopment group had been charged with the strategic mission of proposing 
and developing the "best powertrain 2000." They asked the authors to assist them with 
their choice among 80 transmission development project ideas that had been collected 
recently in response to this mission. Of the 80 candidates, 10 represented new tech-
nologies, such as a continuously variable transmission, while the others were improve-
ments of existing transmission subsystems. 
3. 1 Prior Method of Project Selection 
In the recent past, project selection within the predevelopment group had mainly been 
based on intuition and the evaluation of individual projects in isolation. Engineers had 
a feeling for what constituted a "good" transmission and what tradeoffs had to be made 
in design. There was no established process, and projects were often driven more by 
personality and initiative, than by any explicit weighing of the tradeoffs among projects. 
This level of personal involvement was and still is widely perceived as a "strength" 
within the company. 
Under the previous manager, members of the pre-development group normally decided 
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among themselves which projects to pursue, based on their experience. If it was within 
the regular budget, the pre-development group could choose whatever they wanted. If 
an additional budget was needed, a presentation to upper management had to be made. 
This proved good for motivation, but no systematic discussion of the tradeoffs, or com-
petition among projects occurred within the group. Only at the transfer of concepts 
from pre-development to series development did official committees come into 
play--possibly up to the board level, depending on the resources involved. These 
committees applied sets of criteria-for example, noise or handling considera-
tions-that often seemed to appear unexpectedly to the predevelopment engineer in-
volved. 
Questions such as "Why did you not consider x and y?" would arise without a satisfac-
tory reply from the predevelopment engineer involved. For example, a concept might 
be great for fuel efficiency, and then somebody would drive a prototype and say "Well, 
it's fuel-efficient but I don't like it because it makes noise and costs too much." And 
then the concept just died. fudeed, many of the concepts proposed by pre-development 
died this way. This, of course, caused significant frustration for both the pre-
development engineers and for the development group responsible for introducing new 
drive trains into the market. 
3.2. Developing a Systematic Selection Methodology 
When responsibility for the pre-development group was transferred to a manager who 
came from outside of the transmission-engineering unit, he felt uncomfortable with the 
selection practice that was in place for three reasons. First, he did not have the same 
level of experience as his predecessor, and so, felt he needed a transparent way to util-
ize the expertise of his engineers. He could not generate "gut feel" evaluations himself 
the way his predecessor had. Second, there was feedback from other departments that 
pre-development's "hit-rate"-that is, its ability to identify components that were 
eventually implemented in the vehicle-was perceived as being too low. Less than 
50% of the new transmission technologies developed by the unit were actually adopted 
and implemented in new vehicle development projects. Third, resources were ex-
pended on candidate projects without having a clearly stated reason, and these resources 
needed to be better utilized. 
Having come from within the company, the new manager understood and appreciated 
the need to allow some projects to be driven purely by personal initiative and desire. 
Thus, he asked himself how many decisions could be made in an "objective way," and 
concluded that one could spend 20% of resources on proposals driven by individual 
initiatives, but 80% should be spent on "objectively justified projects." 
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He began by asking himself two very pragmatic questions : "Where do we spend our 
money?" and "What are our needs?" Starting with these questions, he defined a list of 
requirements and collected a list of potential projects together with his experienced 
project managers. Quickly, the group produced a matrix of evaluation criteria and can-
didate projects. Examples of criteria are driving dynamics (contribution of the trans-
mission to vehicle acceleration), economy (fuel consumption), fun and comfort of the 
driver inter-face (e.g., controls and design of the shift lever), cost (development and 
manufacturing), and dimensions and weight. Examples of projects included improve-
ments to current technologies, such as a new gear set, and entirely new technologies, 
such as a continuously variable belt drive transmission. 
Figure 1 presents a subset of the decision criteria as well as a subset of projects by 
transmission subsystem, in the same fom1at used by the predevelopment group. Each 
box in a project row represents the contribution of the project to the target criteria, with 
'+' and '++', respectively, denoting weak and strong contributions, while '-' and '--' de-
note weak and strong negative impacts on target criteria. However, the matrix by itself 
is not sufficient for making a concrete decision. The matrix can identify dominance 
(superiority on all criteria), but cannot compare projects with different strengths and 
weaknesses across criteria. 
Subsystem 1: project l 
Gears project 2 
project 3 
project4 
Subsystem 2: project A 
Controls project B 
project C 
project D 
project E 
project F 
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At this point, the manager discussed the problem with one of the authors with whom he 
regularly interacted in a different context. The possibility emerged of obtaining access 
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to an additional resource to look at the problem, and of getting feedback from an out-
sider who would say " I've read a lot about this" or "I've spoken to other engineering 
companies in this kind of arena" and telling him whether or not he was on the right 
track. 
After several discussions among the authors and the manager, a view of the problem 
emerged as one of covering a performance shortfall-that is, the gap between a quanti-
fied estimate of required, or "target" product perfom1ance corresponding to the "best 
powertrain" and current product perfom1ance. The means to cover this "gap" were pro-
vided by the candidate project proposals. This approach implied that both the gap and 
the "contributions" of the candidate projects had to be quantified. In addition, the re-
source requirements of the projects in tem1s of development capacity needed to be es-
timated because resources were scarce. 
Based on this structured problem fommlation, an analytical approach could be devel-
oped in the form of a mixed-integer linear programming model. Figure 2 summarizes 
the structure of the model. (The mathematical progranm1ing fommlation is included in 
the appendix.) The target criteria appear along the top, with each column in the matrix 
corresponding to a perfom1ance dimension. For each criterion, a gap to target was 
identified, where reaching the target meant establishing a leading position. The gap-to-
target estimates were nom1alized from 0 (no gap) to 100% (large gap). This ensured 
compatibility across the criteria. The list of projects appears to the left, with each row 
corresponding to a candidate project. In the matrix of project contributions, each ele-
ment reflects the contribution of the project (row) to narrowing the target gap (column). 
Binary decision variables for each project indicate whether it was chosen (1 ) or not (0). 
If a project is chosen, it consumes resources, with the resulting resource consumption 
shown on the right. There is a total resource constraint, in person-years, reflecting the 
development capacity in the group. The capacity constraint corresponds to the 
predevelopment capacity over three years, a planning horizon consistent with that util-
ized by the development team and of sufficient length to complete any of the projects.1 
The resulting total target contributions and the remaining gaps are shown at the bottom 
of the matrix. Project interactions are indicated at the bottom left. Only system inter-
actions were identified-that is, incompatible projects that could not be implemented 
within the san1e system. 
A more detailed analysis incorporating scheduling each project and synchronizing the schedule with 
the strategic plan of vehiele introductions into the market was judged as possible, but of low impor-
tance for the purpose of the current selection problem. 
9 
Gap to Target by Criteria 
"' "' 0 "' "' 
.... 
0 "'0 "'0 (.) 
-~ ~ () ..... u -~ 
·u ...:J () u () 0 z.s; z '-< () .... () 0 up.. 0 (.) Target Contributions per Project () (.) '-< u 0 
..... 
"0' ... P... '-< () u ::l '-< ::l 
"' () '-< 0 u 0 0 
"0' p... "' c. :;r. __o u uu '-< p:: p... p::'-+-
0 
"' I Sum of Contributions I Q = :::: :::: .!2 u ... -~ B t) ::l 
"' "' I I 
0 
"' >. ... ~ ::::!ZI 2 Remaining Gaps by Criteria ,::.:: 0 
.E u 
I Criteria Weights I Minimize Sum of . Wetghted Gaps 
D Input data D Decision variables D Calculated variables D Constraints 
Figure 2: Model Structure 
Any target shortfalls, or perfom1ance gaps remaining after all resources are consumed 
by the chosen projects are weighted by the importance of each criterion and summed 
over all criteria. The objective of the model is to fmd the project portfolio that mini-
mizes the sum of the weighted shortfalls without violating the resource capacity and 
system interaction constraints. The model allows "overshoot," or over-fulfillment of a 
target, but does not reward them in the gap minimization. Readers interested in alter-
native model fom1ulations can refer to the extensive previous literature on the subject 
(cf, Beged-Dov 1965, Benson et al. 1993, Czajkowsky and Jones 1986, Schmidt and 
Freeland 1992, Souder 1973 and 1978). 
3.4 Data Collection 
With the proposed framework came the realization that the first list of criteria had been 
on too aggregated a leveL For meaningful analysis, the criteria needed to be quant~fied, 
along with the project contributions to the criteria. However, while quantitative data is 
readily available in traditional modeling applications (e.g., distances in a transshipment 
problem), it is a characteristic of R&D that data are often qualitative and difficult to es-
timate. Data gathering is a major challenge in the implementation process. The pre-
development group had to address three interrelated issues. 
First, the longest and hardest discussion became what should be included in the list of 
criteria. As a first step, this was done within the pre-development group. The list of 
eight general criteria-dynamics, economy, driver interface, comfor t, safety, cost, 
quality and weight-was further specified into a list of 41 quantifiable criteria. For ex-
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ample, dynamics was broken down into "acceleration 0-100 km/hr, acceleration 0-4 
seconds under realistic conditions, acceleration 80-120 km/hr, cold start, hot start," and 
four others, which could all be quantified. The resulting list of 41 criteria then had to 
be cross-checked and confirmed with marketing as well as upper management. 
In addition to identifying the dimensions, the pre-development team also had to decide 
about the relative importance of the criteria. They developed a set of weights for the 
eight general criteria because the engineers had a better intuition about relative impor-
tance at this aggregated level. All specific criteria within the same general criterion re-
ceived an equal share of the general criteria weight. For example, the nine specific cri-
teria within dynamics each received one ninth of the weight given to the general criteria 
of dynamics. 
Second, the group had to quantify perfom1ance and to estimate the gap to target short-
falls. In order to achieve comparability across criteria, they decided to not use physical 
quantities (such as acceleration), but to construct an index with 100 indicating an 
agreed-upon target perfom1ance level for each criterion and 0 the low-end perfom1ance 
among BMW's direct competitors. Target levels of 100 represented an operationaliza-
tion of the strategic mission "best powertrain 2000", and they typically exceeded cur-
rent best-in-class performance. Based on this index, each engineer took responsibility 
for a group of criteria and estimated shortfalls from the target level of 100. Thus, a 
shortfall of zero meant that current performance was already at the target, and a short-
fall of 100 indicated that current performance was at the low end (neither extreme case 
occurred). In a one-day workshop, the whole group discussed the performance esti-
mates and shortfalls, and settled on agreed values. 
Third, the contribution of each candidate project to each performance dimension had to 
be estimated. Each engineer produced a rough estimate for the projects s/he was most 
familiar with. The resulting matrix of 80 projects and 41 criteria looked impossible to 
complete at first glance. However, as is demonstrated in Fif,'1lre 1, the matrix turned out 
to be very sparse because each candidate project was mainly focused on one or two 
general criteria, affecting possibly 4 - 5 specific criteria, including side effects. Thus, 
the number of parameters to be estimated was manageable. Another workshop served 
to achieve familiarity and agreement on the project contributions. 
The product development team could not identify any significant market interac-
tions-for example, benefit of one project in the market depending on the presence of a 
different project--and each project was technically feasible without requiring others as 
"enablers." Overall, only a small number of system interactions were present, and were 
mostly of the type "project A and project B exclude each other in the car". This is par-
tially related to the architecture of a transmission and partially to the fact that projects 
were formulated in a focused manner-that is, targeted to specific transmission sub-
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systems. However, because the few extant system interactions were important in that 
they could significantly influence the optimal project portfolio, they were included in 
the model as constraints. 
3.5 Implementation within the Predevelopment Group 
The pre-development engineer with the broadest experience produced a small "trial 
matrix" for a few criteria and projects to get a feel for the criteria, and to evaluate 
whether it made sense to proceed with the approach. Next, the group manager pre-
sented the matrix as the definitive future decision base within his own group. He posed 
as a challenge to the group that the matrix had to he evaluated completely, forcing engi-
neers to consider the possible negative or positive side effects of their proposed proj-
ects. At this point, he pulled 10 employees from within pre-development into the proj-
ect (part time), and they held weekly meetings. From this time on, every new project 
idea had to be presented in the terms of the matrix. 
When pre-development had the matrix about 60% completed, the authors visited the 
group for a second time, demonstrating how the mathematical program worked. At this 
point, several subtle concepts emerged and were discussed with the group. For exam-
ple, the fact that projects could not be ranked because, depending on the level of re-
sources available, a project could be chosen that would then make other, previously at-
tractive projects unnecessary or unattractive. Much time was also spent playing with 
the model to test its behavior against the intuition of the engineers. 
Over the next few weeks, e-mails were exchanged to clarify many of the difficulties in-
volved in adapting the model to changes made by the group. It became clear, by way of 
the questions that were asked, that although the engineers understood the particular im-
plementation of the model as discussed at the meeting, they had not acquired a general 
understanding of the methodology. In retrospect, this is certainly understandable given 
the level of complexity of the methodology being introduced. 
The decision model was used for the first time to decide between improving the current 
four-speed automatic transmission and developing a new continuously variable trans-
mission (CVT). Figure 3 shows the output of the model (with criteria, contributions 
and perfom1ance gaps) for the CVT project as it was visually presented to management. 
Criteria are numbered along the horizontal axis (1 through 41 , numbers protect the con-
fidentiality of the actual criteria used). The criteria are grouped into major areas of inl-
pact (e.g., criteria 1 - 9 affect driving dynamics, as is indicated at the bottom of the 
Figure). The perfom1ance gaps along the criteria are indicated by the height of the bold 
line, i.e. the indices on the vertical axis represent the magnitude of an in1provement 
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need. A negative gap would indicate that current performance is more than sufficient 
(nowhere the case). 
Project contributions to the performance gaps are indicated by shaded regions along the 
criteria. Negative contributions reflect the fact that the project reduces performance on 
some criteria. For example, the CVT transmission has noise problems, reducing per-
formance on acoustics (criteria 19, in the "comfort" group). Critical problem areas are 
highlighted in the graph with bubbles and question marks. They direct management 
attention to criteria where the project leaves (or worsens) the gap between required and 
delivered perfom1ance. For example, a large problem exists with respect to space (cri-
teria 39, in the weight group), and with respect to manufacturing cost (criteria 41, where 
the CVT does not address an urgent demand for cost reduction). 
100 
80 
60 
4 0 
20 
-20 
-40 
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dynamics comfort 
safety 
Figure 3: Proposal Chart for CVT Project 
manufacturing 
cost 
Management had a very limited ability to process even this level of complexity within 
one hour, but they appreciated the systematic consideration and weighing of all criteria, 
and thus they trusted and approved the proposed decision. Their decision was based 
entirely on the criteria, contributions and gaps. Resource usage and project interference 
were not used: they were viewed as not important for the choice between the four-speed 
upgrade and the CVT projects. 
Thus, the matrix of criteria, contributions and gaps was successfully used as a decision 
support tool with upper management. The matrix is now becoming the standard in the 
transmission pre-development group, and a pilot is being applied in the engine group 
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during March 1998. 
3.6 Diffusion to Other R&D Sub-units 
Given that other technology groups within BMW struggled with similar issues, the pre-
development manager then introduced the concept of structured project selection into 
the entire drive train development organization. In communicating, he focused on the 
criteria, project contributions and gaps, rather than on the detailed quantitative method. 
The criteria were derived from the high-level criteria used in the company, and there-
fore, the other groups understood where they came from and were reasonably comfort-
able with the idea. Together they discussed again the list of criteria, and made correc-
tions to get some of the numbers-that is, gaps and contributions--right. This way, the 
manager achieved acceptance from the other brroups. 
It has to be noted that the word "optimization" never left the pre-development group. 
External to his group, the manager emphasized the matrix of criteria, contributions and 
gaps, and would only casually mention the tern1s "resource constraints" and "project 
portfolio." This reflected a purposeful decision on his part to shield the rest of the or-
ganization from the mathematical program until he felt that it was understood and suc-
cessfully in1plemented within his own group. The methodology was demonstrated at a 
company-wide exhibition event aimed at engineering management. The exhibition pre-
sented computer-based tools for improving the engineering process, and the model was 
included as a decision tool, along with other technical problem solving tools. 
The pre-development manager approached upper management (up to the head of over-
all R&D) with the model only after buy-in from other departments was achieved. The 
model was used in the forn1 of the matrix of criteria, contributions and gaps to obtain 
project approval. The matrix was never presented to management in its full form-it is 
much too large to visually comprehend. Instead, the manager produced a subset of a 
few, obviously competing projects-such as new technology versus improvement to 
existing technology--across all criteria. In addition, he presented the gaps and contri-
butions in graphical fom1at sin1ilar to that presented in Fibrure 3. 
4. Observations and Discussion 
In this case study, we have seen all the typical characteristics of coaxing an organiza-
tion into adopting a new, unknown methodology: a clear need for a new approach was 
identified, new ideas were brought into the organization, internal resistance within the 
sub-unit were overcome, the new ideas were adapted to local use and then were dif-
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fused to other, interdependent sub-units within the organization. fu addition, the effort 
benefited from the competence and curiosity of the people involved, who were moti-
vated to understand how the analytical model worked. 
fu spite of this success, the resource-constrained optimization feature of the model was 
not used by the organization. We argue that this partial implementation of the modeling 
methodology reflects both the limitations of the methodology and limitations of the 
technology transfer process. As Klein and Serra ( 1996) recognize, "(a)n organization' s 
failure to achieve the intended benefits of an innovation it has adopted may thus reflect 
either a failure of implementation or a failure of the innovation itself' (p. 1 055). 
4.1. Limitations of the Mathematical Programming Model 
Analytical models are often incomplete and fail to capture adequately all relevant con-
siderations (e.g., Schmidt and Freeland 1992). Moreover, full adoption of the method-
ology by the organization would have required significant additional resources in terms 
of man-hours invested to understand and modify the constrained optimization model. 
Therefore, the decision not to use the constrained optimization could be viewed as a ra-
tional, economic decision reflecting the highest benefit per effort invested. fu this light, 
further attempts to improve the model could yield further adoption by the organization. 
Of course, the actual costs and benefits of full implementation are difficult to quantify 
and, in this case, no attempts were made to do so. Thus, it is difficult to fully justify 
this argument. Never the less, it is worthwhile to discuss the current limitations of the 
model, as we see them. 
Structuring the decision problem as minimizing perfom1ance gaps using existing re-
sources helped the pre-development group to think of how to use the matrix of criteria, 
project contributions and target gaps. fu addition, it forced them to think about what 
was the driving f actor or factors. Was there a "killer criteria" that was difficult to 
cover? Was it resources? Furthem1ore, the discussion of the model helped to drive the 
quunt!f'iculion of the criteria, although the manager felt that they would have performed 
the quantification sooner or later, even without the model. The organization gained 
confidence that the comparison of projects with respect to reduction of total shor tfall 
was insightful and robust- for example, a mis-estimation of a few parameters would 
not significantly distort the conclusion. However, they could not get to the same confi-
dence level for the constrained optimization for three reasons; robustness, representa-
tion of uncertainty and complexity. 
First, integer-valued constrained optimization problems tend to be non-robust. Small 
changes in parameters can result in a large change in the optin1al portfolio, while pro-
ducing only a small change in the objective function (here, weighted sum of shortfalls). 
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This became apparent when, during the testing of the model, different project combina-
tions resulted in the same total shortfall. As shortfalls, weights and contributions were 
subjectively estin1ated by the engineers, they tended to be whole round nun1bers (e.g., a 
shortfall is never 25.6, but 10, 20, 30, etc.). This reduced the robustness of the model: 
many portfolios clustered around similar objective function values, and small parameter 
changes could make the optin1al portfolio tumble. Technically, this issue could be cir-
cumvented by introducing small perturbations in the criteria weights. However, such 
perturbations were seen as arbitrary, and could not overcome the group ' s skepticism 
resulting from this model behavior. 
Second, the mathematical model would always make point recommendations, reflecting 
the difficulty in taking into account the full impact of uncertainty. 2 fu addition, this ap-
proach neglects the possibility of choosing a suboptimal por~folio because it is more 
robust in case of a contingency--in market demands, for example, or technical out-
comes (Harrison and Van Mieghem, 1995). Given the combinatorial nature of the 
problem, sensitivity analysis proved of limited value for the constrained optimization, 
while it was easy to accomplish for the simple project comparisons adopted. 
Third, the complexity of the model and limitations of the software implementation 
made it difficult for engineers to understand what happened inside the "black box'' of 
the model. Even for a simple 3x3 matrix, they could not understand what the algorithm 
really did. In particular, as was explained above, multiple optimal solutions existed in 
small examples, and the algorithm stopped at different ones depending on the starting 
points. This alone was perceived as disconcerting, but in addition, not all the optinml 
solutions found made equally good sense, and it was hard to accept that the algorithm 
stopped without any further "conm1on sense," based only on minimized total shortfall 
versus the targets across all criteria. The engineers were, in fact, learning a new mod-
eling approach (mathematical programming), including interpretation of results, and a 
specific software program (What's Best running on top of Excel) at the same time. 
In addition, changes in model fidelity often required changes in the structure of the 
model, not just its paran1eters. Thus, each change required getting help from the 
authors. More training than time permitted was needed to get the engineers to the point 
where they could use the model by themselves. This aspect of the problem would be 
difficult to fix without creating a very elaborate user interface. 
Finally, the algorithm took a long time to find a solution in a few instances, where the 
problem was numerically ill conditioned (related to the round number estimates of the 
parameters described above).3 The model and the algorithms to solve it could have 
A Monte Carlo simulation using Crystal Ball™ was developed to assess the impact of uncertainty. 
However, the group could not absorb this additional methodology in the time frame of the project. 
When the run-time problems occurred, the authors contacted What 's Best to check for errors in the 
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been modified to take advantage of particular structural characteristics of the problem. 
Although resource intensive, this model improvement could have helped to speed solu-
tion time in some problem instances. This would have required a significant increase in 
the level of abstraction of the analytical model. Since the group was at the limit of its 
resources anyway, the engineers did not have the slack to absorb further abstraction. 
When these problems occurred, the analytical approach was kept alive by a combina-
tion of persistence of the manager and intrinsic interest on the side of the engineers. 
The pre-development manager summarized the requirements for a software program 
implementing an R&D project selection method as follows: 
• The software needs to work quickly and easily with good graphics 
• The software needs to be logically transparent-{)ne must be able to infer the 
logic from examining simple examples 
• Optimization features should be used only to the extent that they are of limited 
complexity and in instances where the problem to be solved is robust 
• Above all, the model should be able to simply describe, summarize, and graph. 
4.2 Limitations of the Technology Transfer Process 
With respect to the implementation process, we observed that the manager's behavior 
played a very important role in the adoption of innovations. Here, the manager acted as 
a "boundary spanner" (Tushman, 1977) or "gatekeeper" (Allen and Cohen, 1969) in his 
role as the primary interface between the authors and the R&D group. Thus, the extent 
to which the model was adopted was strongly influenced by purposeful actions of the 
manager. 
However, the manager could only provide so much input into the process. Like the 
members of his group, he was unfamiliar with the proposed modeling methodology and 
so could not actually effect the transfer. Here, what was needed was intensive interac-
tion with the authors, the diffusing agents. Strong ties had to be developed and sus-
tained, both within the group--for purposes of developing and agreeing to the data re-
quired of the model--and between the group and the authors--for purposes of under-
standing the modeling methodology. Here, the extent of implementation was strongly 
influenced by the limited resources of both the members of the group and the diffusing 
agents. A "window of opportunity" (Tyre and Orlikowski, 1992) existed where both 
the adopting organization and the diffusing agents were prepared to allocate sufficient 
resources to the transfer. Once the window was closed, further absorption and imple-
mentation of the model was unlikely. 
algorithm. Ironically, there was a bug in the program at first (a brand new version was used), and 
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4.2. 1 Weak Ties and The Role of the Manager as uBoundary Spanner" 
The manager of the pre-development group spanned three important organizational 
boundaries: (i) the extra-organizational boundary; (ii) the intra-subunit boundary; and 
(iii) the sub-unit to organization boundary (Tushman, 1977). He spanned the extra-
organizational boundary through his on-going contacts with one of the authors. This 
contact allowed him to bring a new, innovative approach into the pre-development 
group: the mathematical progran1 for project selection. The contact was utilized be-
cause he knew that the author would bring in an outside perspective on the problem: a 
perspective honed by research and contacts with other R&D organizations. 
He spanned the intra-subunit boundary as manager of the predevelopment group. Not 
surprisingly, there was resistance within the group, and had the manager not pushed the 
whole time, the approach would not have been pursued. First, the engineers in his 
group never related the fact that they did not get their project proposals approved to a 
lack of a structured approach. Second, they had limited time to invest in defining crite-
ria and completing the matrix. This took time away from other activities. They were 
engineers who would rather design technology than fill in matrices. Third, the model 
itself added to the resistance because it required several leaps at once--quantifying cri-
teria and understanding a new optimization methodology. This proved too much, espe-
cially in light of the software's previously mentioned shortcomings. Finally, there was 
the fear that they would become the slaves of the numbers the model would produce: 
"Let's say the number' 115' comes out for one project, and someone says 'let's do this 
project, it has the biggest number attached to it, ' but we don't like that project!" 
Careful management helped to overcome this skepticism and mistrust. The group's 
manager left no doubt that the matrix was the future decision base within the group, 
committing himself to the importance of criteria, gaps and contributions. In order to 
calm the enbrineers' worries, it was clearly and repeatedly emphasized that the numbers 
were not the key, but producing the criteria and evaluating them, and discussing them 
with the experts in a more structured approach, to improve transparency. Everyone 
should understand what were the criteria, not just a few highlights. With this, the whole 
group would be more comfortable in making decisions and be able to sharpen their "gut 
feel." 
The manager spanned the sub-unit to organization boundary through his interactions 
with the rest of the design organization. Because he understood the organization, crite-
ria were chosen that were consistent with the high-level criteria used within the com-
pany. Thus, other groups were more comfortable with the matrix of criteria, contribu-
tions and gaps. Also, he never asked other groups for resources until the matrix was 
only after the bug was fixed was it confirmed that these few problem instances were ill conditioned. 
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demonstrated and they could convince themselves that the work made sense. 
Finally, and most importantly, it should be noted that the manager filtered and adapted 
the innovation in diffusing it within his group and to the other groups. The manager 
decided to never use the word "optimization" outside of the pre-development group. 
Externally, only the tem1s "resource constraints" and "project portfolio" appeared. This 
filtering was fundamental in getting the matrix of criteria, contributions and gaps ac-
cepted by the rest of the organization (Thompson, 1967). Although the manager com-
mitted himself to the matrix of criteria, gaps and contributions, he never forced the 
group to adopt the optimization methodology. 
4.2.2 Strong Ties and The Resource Requirements of Technology Transfer 
As Von Hipple (1994) discovered, the infom1ation used in problem solving is "costly to 
acquire, transfer and use in a new location" and that when this "sticky information" re-
sides in more than one location, "the locus of problem solving may iterate among these 
sites as problem solving proceeds." Thus, not surprisingly, many face-to-face and e-
mail exchanges were required to in1part the many subtle and complex aspects of such 
methodologies and to address unforeseen problems that would arise as a result of some 
desired change to the model. These problem iterations consumed not only the resources 
of the potential adopter, but those of the diffusing agents as well. 
Because resources are rarely conm1itted indefinitely to such projects, a fmite conmlit-
ment of resources, both by the diffusing agents and by the potential adopters, created a 
"window of opportunity" within which as much progress as possible must be made on 
the adoption of the innovation. This project was no different in this respect. Both the 
academics and the pre-development groups budgeted tin1e to the project before its in-
ception. Deadlines were set and the project was halted once these deadlines were met. 
The window of opportunity closed and interactions between the group and the authors 
reverted back to their pre-project weak-tie form. 
The manager of the pre-development group estin1.ates that he got about 80% of what he 
had wanted from the effort. This 80% could be achieved based on project comparison 
along their contribution to shortfall reduction, without recourse to constrained optimi-
zation. The reh'Ular, monthly discussions of the structured approach motivated every-
body to continue to think about how their projects would impact all of the criteria. The 
structure and its implementation as a mathematical programming model also provided 
an intellectual challenge for the engineers. The model structure helped everyone to un-
derstand the process of project choice better and thus led to higher transparency of de-
cisions, or in other words, to more f act-based decisions: they learned to understand the 
matrix, the numbers and what they meant, and the in1portance of interference across 
pruje<.:ts. The value of this is eviuem:eu b y the fa<.:t !hal the firsl proposal they made 
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using the matrix of criteria, contributions and gaps was immediately approved by upper 
management. Thus, the effort is counted as a success overall, and it will be further 
rolled out and developed. 
However, the other side of the story is that 20% of the hoped-for results were missing. 
In spite of the fact that the manager believes that their current methods are too simplis-
tic, the group is not using the model for constrained optimization (only for finding the 
projects with the highest weighted shortfall reduction). The group manager recognizes 
that their current use of the matrix of criteria, gaps and contributions does not take into 
account interdependencies among projects, nor that the projects compete for the same 
limited resources (mainly manpower). Initially, the group made the implicit decision 
that interdependencies and scarce resources did not matter much in the first step of the 
analysis. But resources are becoming an issue at the moment, so the group is looking at 
optimization with renewed interest. The manager feels that as the group becomes more 
familiar and comfortable with the matrix tool, they may start using it in a more sophisti-
cated manner. This will depend, of course, on the continuing support of the group's 
manager and on the continuing involvement of the authors. Thus, as both the authors 
and the predevelopment group move on to other activities, it is quite likely that the 
predevelopment group will settle with the benefits already achieved. 
5. Conclusions and Outlook 
We have developed in this paper a structured model of R&D project selection which 
allowed the transmission pre-development group of BMW to move from a relatively 
unsystematic way of project selection to a structured approach. Successful adoption of 
the new method was achieved, starting with a clear need for the new approach, over-
coming resistance through convincing skeptics, carefully supporting the learning of the 
people involved, emphasizing the qualitative insights, and consistently maintaining 
managerial attention. The new method was successfully used as a decision support for 
upper management. It helped the group to think through the decision criteria and to 
quantitatively compare projects according to their contribution. It led to higher trans-
parency of the selection process and to more fact-based decisions. 
It is an important insight that the organization adopted only those elements of the mod-
eling method offering the highest benefit per effort invested. The adoption of the con-
strained optin1ization part would have resulted only in a marbrinal additional benefit 
while requiring sihrnificant additional resources. It is important for the modeler to ac-
cept that partial adoption in this sense may be the best possible outcome of the imple-
mentation effort for the adopter. 
This is consistent with Hayes (1969) who observed that" ... the greatest impact of the 
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quantitative approach will not be in the area of problem solving ( ... ). Its greatest im-
pact will be on problem formulation: the way managers think about their problems. ( ... ) 
In this sense, results ( ... ) contribute in a really significant way to the art of manage-
ment." We add to this that it is not only the problem formulation that creates value, but 
also a quantitative analysis to the extent that it remains transparent to the host organiza-
tion and is robust with respect to model perturbations-for example, from estimation or 
incompleteness. 
We also report observations concerning the role of key boundary spanners and manag-
ers in the process of adoption. Boundary spanners are likely to play a critical role in the 
diffusion of models and methods from academia to industry. The thoughts and actions 
of these boundary spanners, especially if they are also managers, will have decisive ef-
fect on the extent to which the innovation is adopted. Finally, the adoption of any inno-
vation takes the resources of both the diffusing agents as well as the potential adopters. 
When resources are budgeted, a window of opportunity is created within which the in-
novation must be understood, modified and adopted. 
R&D project selection is an unstructured and difficult decision area, which has led to a 
widespread use of decisions based on "gut-feeling" in practice. One fundamental diffi-
culty is related to the absence of quantitative data, which makes data collection and 
structuring itself a valuable effort. This article provides a detailed case example that, 
beyond data structuring, R&D project selection is amenable to quantitative analysis. 
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APPENDIX: MODEL FORMULATION 
This is a standard mixed integer linear program (see [2, 5 ]), with the added feature that 
projects can be targeted at the different transmission types, and system constraints hold 
only within types. This allows product line variety across types. 
Parameters: i =project index, j =target din1ension index, 
k = transmission type index with k = 1, ... K. 
GkJ = gap to target for transmission type k on target dimensionj 
biJ =contribution of project ito dimensionj (same for all k) 
C; =resource requirement (in Person Years) of project i 
C =available development capacity (in Person Years) 
wkJ = importance weight of din1ensionj for transmission type k 
vk = importance weight of the transmission type k. 
EkJ = excess of target fulfillment for transmission type k on din1ensionj. 
This variable is a resulting accounting variable computed endoge-
nously (see below). 
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Decision Variables: 
X ; = 1 if project i is chosen and 0 if not 
xki = 1 if project i is targeted at transmission type k and 0 if not 
SkJ =remaining shortfall to fulfilling gap for type k on dimensionj after 
all project contributions. 
Minin1ize: Lk vk L j wkJ ~j 
subject to: 1. EkJ = L.i [bij x ki ]- GkJ + S~._1 'r;f k 
2. skj , Ekj 2 o 'r;f k,J 
3. x ki ,xi E {0, 1} 'r;f k,i 
4. L.k [x~.__,] :::; Kx; 'r;/i 
5. L.; c; x ; :::; C 
6. M- Mx~._-, 2 L.mES xkm (example, for a specific k and n) 
7. L.mES x t.:m :::; 1 (example, for a specific 3 and k) 
The objective function is the total weighted shortfall against the targets over all dimen-
sions and transmission types. Constraints 1 and 2 are key accounting constraints neces-
sary because the client does not want to "reward" an over-fulfilment of any target di-
mension. At the same time, they keep the problem linear and thus more easily solvable. 
The sum in constraint 1 is the total contribution to target dimensionj for transmission k. 
If it is larger than the target gap, then the excess is positive, and shortfall can be left at 
zero. If the total contribution is smaller than the gap, then shortfall must be set positive 
in order to fulfill constraint 2. Since shortfall is minimized, this will prompt an attempt 
to introduce additional projects to reduce the necessary level of shortfalls. Thus, the SkJ 
are formally decision variables, but have only the role to prevent the optimization algo-
rithm from pursuing target overfulfilments. 
Constraint 3 specifies the integer constraints (projects are either pursued or not), and 
constraint 4 expresses that a project can only be targeted at any transmission type if it is 
pursued in the first place. Constraint 5 ensures that the set of projects pursued does not 
require more than the available development capacity. 
Constraints 6 and 7 are examples of projects mutually excluding one another. In con-
straint 6, project n cannot be done at the same time as any of the M projects in set 3. 
Thus, if any X~cm is chosen, then Xt:n must be zero to fulfill the constraint; conversely, if 
x~._-, = 1, then all the X~cm 's must be zero to fulfill the constraint. Similarly, in constraint 7 
all the projects in the set are mutually exclusive, thus at most one of them can be chosen 
larger than zero. In our case, we had ten constraints of the type of 6 and 7. These con-
straints only hold within a transmission type, thus variety across types is possible. 
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